Why reports of recent US Naval ship collisions puzzle and sadden me

As my students know, I spent five years on active duty in the US Navy. This was preceded by four years as a “Midshipman,” while attending Dartmouth College, prior to commissioning as an “Ensign” the most junior officer rank.

Three of my active duty years were “sea duty” on the USS Lansing, a 300 plus foot long radar picket destroyer (DER388). One of the most responsible duties of a naval officer at sea is standing “Officer Of the Deck” watches. I was also Officer of the Deck during general quarters and “special sea detail” (circumstances involving greater potential hazards to the ship like entering and leaving port

In the capacity of “officer of the deck” safety of the ship is one of his (or her)  primary responsibilities.  He is “on watch” quite literally. Officer of the Deck watches are particularly important during the hours from 10PM in the evening until 7 AM or so when the ship’s captain may be asleep or, at least, no on the ship’s bridge.

In discussion of the collisions with container ship and abstract speculations about causes of these two catastrophic collisions, why has been no mention the fact that respective officers of the deck failed to carry out their duties  Were they not on the bridge, looking about them, carrying out their primary mission ensuring the safety of their ships?  Along with the ship’s captains (who have – properl _y been targeted)  why have they not been mentioned as complicit in these happenings.  How could these  officers of the not have seen the huge bulk of a container ship and maneuvered to avoid it.  Why are discussions of these catastrophes couched in abstractions?  Was the officer of the deck not on deck?  Was he relying on some IT system rather than viewing the circumstances of this ship through the bridge window shields, anticipating the problem, summoning the captain to the bridge and, in the meantime taking the necessary evasive action.

Perhaps the US Navy has become a different organization, with different definitions of responsibility than when I served.  However I find it hard to understand why collisions between naval vessels and container ships could not have been avoided if officers of the deck and the captains who qualified them as watch standers had been following the practices and precautions that were viewed as imperatives during my years of active duty naval service.